One of the most important current questions in economic analysis is whether or not labor markets clear in the short run. To answer this, it is necessary to be able to distinguish between restricted and unrestricted behavior by consumers supplying labor. This paper investigates the forms of preferences which lie behind linear models of labor supply, and derives the functional forms for commodity demands which accompany them, both with and without quantity restrictions in the labor market. Simple linkages between restricted and unrestricted demands are also considered as is the question of perfect aggregation over consumers in the presence of quantity restrictions.
INTRODUCTION
OUR MAIN AIM in this paper is to exploit the theory of rationing to propose plausible functional forms for commodity demand functions in the presence of quantity constraints in the labor market. Such functions, together with their unrationed counterparts, are essential for the analysis of cross-section or longitudinal data on labor supply and commodity demands in situations where some consumers face quantity constraints, for example, unemployment, or, equivalently nonparticipation, and others do not. Only if the demand functions for both are derived from a single common specification of preferences can efficient estimation be ensured. We show how this can be done using two sets of preferences for which the unconditional labor and income supply (i.e. wage times labor supply) functions are linear in the wage and in nonlabor income, and we provide a comparative discussion of the rationed and unrationed functional forms. Finally, we derive conditions under which, in general, commodity demand functions with quantity restrictions in the labor market can be thought of as unrestricted demands modified by an amount proportional to the difference between the enforced and desired labor supply. Such functions provide a simple tool for analyzing the interactions between markets when not all markets clear. A major concern throughout the paper is to consider, for each of the three classes of preferences, conditions under which the microeconomic supply and demand functions aggregate exactly to functions defined on the averages of the independent variables, whether there are wage rates, nonlabor incomes, or ration levels.
In the voluminous literature on labor supply, the most frequently estimated functional form is that in which labor supply is taken as linear in the wage rate and in nonlabor income. Examples are Boskin [ [13, 14] , Nakamura, Nakamura, and Cullen [19] , and Layard, Barton, and Zabalza [16] . The second most popular form, which is also conveniently linear in the wage and in nonlabor income, is probably the labor supply function ' We are grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier version. 1521 embodied in the linear expenditure system; see Abbot 
I. CONVENIENT FORMS FOR UNRATIONED LABOR SUPPLY FUNCTIONS (a) Linear Labor Supply Functions
In empirical labor supply studies, a relationship of the following form is frequently estimated:
(1) 1 = 80 + 81 (o + 82 where / is hours worked, X is the wage rate, and jt is unearned or transfer income. In theory, this must be the solution of the problem of maximizing utility u, given by (2) u = v(qo, q) subject to the budget constraint2
where q is a vector of commodities with prices p, qo is the amount of leisure, T is the time endowment (so that I T -qo), and x is full income, cT + jt. Corresponding to the problem (2) and (3), there exists a "full" cost function c(u, c, p) defined as the minimum cost of reaching u at o and p which, for a utility maximizing consumer, takes the value x, i.e. The fact that (12) aggregates exactly across individuals with the same preferences is convenient for working with grouped or aggregate data on per capita hours, wage rates, and nonlabor incomes. However, the corresponding commodity demand functions do not share this convenience because of the presence of quadratic and interaction terms. From this point of view, the next set of preferences we consider is more attractive. 
FUNCTIONAL FORMS FOR RESTRICTED DEMANDS
If labor supply is predetermined outside the consumer's control, then commodity demand functions are conditional on income (or total expenditure) and, in the absence of separability between leisure and goods, on the amount of employment, rather than depending, as in Section 1, on the wage rate and transfer income separately. However, both sets of commodity demand functions are derived from the same set of preferences, the only difference being the existence of the additional labor market constraint. This can be handled according to the theory of rationing and the effects of the quantity constraint can be analyzed from the first-order conditions for utility maximization as originally laid out by Tobin and Houthakker [25] . However, as is well known, this methodology only characterizes the rationed demand function locally, giving the derivatives of the constrained demands in the neighborhood of the point where the constraint only just begins to bind. It cannot yield global formulae for rationed and unrationed demands. To do this, we must take a dual approach. Here, we give only the briefest possible summary, translated to our context, of those results in Neary and Roberts [20] which are required for our derivations. Both (31) and (34) are linear in income given z, so that both permit exact linear aggregation of commodity demands over workers all of whom are rationed to the same level. However, only for (34) do the corresponding unrestricted commodity demands aggregate linearly. Suppose one had aggregate consumption data generated by a population of individuals some of whom could freely choose their labor supply according to (19) while the rest were unemployed with z = T for each. Then, given knowledge of the average wage and unearned income for each of the two groups, average consumption is given by the weighted average of (22), averaged for the employed, and (34), averaged for the unemployed, the weights being the fractions of individuals employed and unemployed respectively. These functions are the most general which permit this exact aggregation. Ashenfelter's [3] study is of this type although he is forced to assume that both sets of individuals have the same nonlabor income less savings. Also the linear expenditure system which he uses is a simplified form of (22) and (34) that assumes additive preferences both between goods and between goods and leisure.
Let z be the amount to which qo is constrained (e.g. T for involuntary unemployment). Then define the restricted cost function
For ( 
ON A SIMPLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RATIONED AND UNRATIONED

DEMANDS
In the absence of specific functional forms for rationed demand functions, a number of authors (see e.g. Ito [15] , Portes [22] , and Muellbauer [17] ) have worked with a simple linear relationship linking rationed and unrationed demands. Here, for rationed and unrationed Marshallian demands, gi(x, o, p) and gj*(X, co, p, z), the hypothesis in its most general form is that i.e. the effect of the ration on unrationed demands is proportional to the difference between the ration and the notional demand for the rationed good. Note that the constant of proportionality, although allowably a function of x, c, and p, is not a function of z. Although (35) has a degree of superficial plausibility, it is not obvious whether or not it is consistent with rationing and preference theory. In particular, note that although w can only have income effects on the left-hand side of (35), its effects on the unrationed demands on the right-hand side are apparently unrestricted. As we shall demonstrate, this limits the class of preferences for which (35) is globally valid.
Since X only affects gi*( ) through the income effect, it is generally true that The final functional form is perhaps surprisingly general, the only real restriction being that preferences should be such as to generate linearity in the rationed demands. Note in particular that separability is not required. The preferences represented by (43) are not weakly separable between goods and leisure except in the case where b(p) = 0. However, given weak separability, the commodity branch of utility must take the Gorman polar form and exhibit linear (group) Engel curves. An example which does so is the linear expenditure system. In general, however, weak separability is essentially irrelevant in the construction of (35), either locally or globally. Note, finally, in reference to the claim at the end of the previous section, that (39) permits exact linear aggregation over individuals with differing ration levels z and incomes ex-ration, x -oz, i.e. y above. It is clearly also the most general set of functions to do so, so that (40) and (43) represent the most general form of restricted and unrestricted preferences allowing exact aggregation of the rationed demands.
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